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POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Edward B. Foley*
In a new book that builds upon a series of articles published
during the last decade,1 John Rawls provides a systematic account
of "political liberalism." For purposes of this essay, "political liber-
alism" is defined as the idea that the state, insofar as is possible,
should remain uncommitted to any of the various religious faiths or
other "comprehensive" philosophies that exist in modem society.2
The Establishment Clause, properly construed, is the Constitution's
textual embodiment of this idea of political liberalism: the basic
purpose of including the Establishment Clause within the Bill of
Rights was to prohibit the new federal government from developing
an allegiance to any of the various religious belief-systems that
then existed, or that might come to exist, within American cul-
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. I. would like to thank the
editors of this Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium. A somewhat
different version of this paper was presented at the Ohio Legal Theory Workshop, and I
am grateful for the opportunity to have the benefit of that forum as well. Finally, a num-
ber of friends and colleagues have given me valuable comments on earlier drafts, especial-
ly Jim Fleming and Larry Solum, who have helped me to clarify the relationship between
Rawls' views and my own. Whatever confusion and errors that remain are, of course,
attributable solely to my own misunderstanding of Rawls' work.
1. JOHN RAWLS, POLrnICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POuTICAL LIBER-
ALISM]. Prior to its publication, Professor Rawls kindly provided me with a draft manu-
script of his new book prior to its publication. The articles are as follows: The Domain
of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989); The Priority
of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988); The Idea of the
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1987); Justice as Fairness: Political
Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL & PU. AFF. 223 (1985).
2. By "comprehensive- philosophy, Rawls means an ideology or belief-system that
addresses not merely political issues (such as the distribution of wealth in society) but
also metaphysical or meta-ethical issues (such as whether God exists, or whether moral
duties are discovered or invented). See RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERAIISM, supra note 1, at
11-15.
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ture.3 Accordingly, the ongoing task of developing a coherent cor-
pus of Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be aided consider-
ably by understanding and appreciating the insights that Rawls
provides in his account of political liberalism.
4
Rawls, it must be acknowledged, is not the only philosopher
who has been at work in recent years on the idea of political liber-
alism. Charles Larmore, in particular, has made important contribu-
tions to the topic.5 But I focus on Rawls for purposes of this sym-
posium so that my necessarily brief discussion of political liberal-
ism may be as clear as possible.
3. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Noncoercive Support for Religion: Another False Claim
about the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1991). Of course, as originally
adopted, the Establishment Clause, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, applied only to the
federal government and not to the states. Along with most other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the Establishment Clause is now understood as having been incorporated into
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore now controls the practices of
state governments in precisely the same way as it does the practices of the federal gov-
ernment.
4. By focusing my remarks on political liberalism, I intend no disparagement of Dean
Smith's efforts to substitute the term "conscience" for "religion" in Establishment Clause
analysis. See Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion, and the Establishment of Religion:
The Beginning of an End to the Wandering of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 917, 926-33 (1993). On the contrary, I wholeheartedly support this substitution
and, in support, observe that Rawls also uses the term "liberty of conscience" to describe
the central principle of justice applicable to the issue of church-state relations. See
PAWLS, PoLmcAL LmERAISM, supra note 1, at 227 (emphasis added).
I hope, however, that my remarks demonstrate that substituting "conscience" for
"religion" will not solve all the problems that confront contemporary Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Even if we use "conscience" in place of "religion," we still need to explain
how the principle of equality applies to the liberty of conscience - since most of us
assume that the liberty of conscience is a right to which we are all equally entitled. For
example, James Madison, while using "religion" and "conscience" interchangeably, under-
scored the "equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of Con-
science." JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS 4 (1785) (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. 16, reprinted in Appendix
to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 66 (1947)). Madison made unmistakably clear
that he considered the principle of equality to be crucial to protection of religious liberty:
"Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the
Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to
those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us." Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, my contribution to this symposium is an effort to explore the
principle of equality as it applies to "liberty of conscience" (or, alternatively, "freedom of
religion").
5. See Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POLITIcAL THEORY 339 (1990).
6. Do not assume, however, that in explaining political liberalism I follow Rawis'
account in every respect. Moreover, insofar as I use the term "Rawlsian" to describe my
own ideas, I do so not to suggest that Rawls would agree with all (or even much) of
what I say, but rather only to acknowledge my reliance upon his work in developing
these ideas. I trust that Rawls himself would appreciate this use of the term "Rawlsian,"
[Vol. 43:963
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND ITS RELATION-
SHIP TO THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A Rawlsian approach to church-state relations leads one to
reject the so-called "coercion" test,7 which some have suggested as
a replacement for the "endorsement" test that has prevailed in
recent years.' The endorsement test is a refinement of the basic
principle of "neutrality" that has guided Establishment Clause juris-
prudence ever since Everson v. Board of Education,9 and political
liberalism teaches that the government should endeavor to maintain
a position of strict impartiality among different religious belief-
systems and, most certainly, must not endorse any particular reli-
gion as the one true faith.1"
Rawls is quick to acknowledge, however, that the state cannot
be completely neutral toward all religions. As he explains, some
religions are antithetical to the requirements of liberalism (for ex-
ample, a religion that insists upon a theocracy), and the liberal
state necessarily must reject as erroneous any religion that contra-
dicts the basic tenets of liberalism itself.' In this way Rawls re-
places the idea of complete neutrality with a new standard of limit-
since he has used the term "Kantian" to acknowledge the intellectual origin of his own
ideas, without claiming that Kant would have agreed with everything he says. See, e.g.,
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERAIISM, supra note 1, at 222 n.9 ("Here I accept the Kantian (not
Kant's) view that what we affirm on the basis of free and informed reason and reflection
is affirmed freely . . . .") (emphasis added).
7. Michael Paulsen describes the coercion test:
Government may not, through direct legal sanction (or threat thereof) or as a
condition of some other right, benefit or privilege, require individuals to engage
in acts of religious exercise, worship, expression or affirmation, nor may it
require individuals to attend or give their direct and personal financial support
to a church or religious body or ministry.
Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993) (empha-
sis removed).
8. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-63 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Paulsen, supra note 7, at 796 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The
Lost Element in Establishment Clause Analysis, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
The endorsement test, as its name implies, prohibits the government from engaging in
practices that have either the purpose or effect of endorsing any religious belief (including
a generic belief in religious faith in contradistinction to atheism or a rejection of religious
faith). See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590-94.
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590-94, the Court traced the history
of the endorsement test to Everson and other early Establishment Clause cases, including
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 10.
11. "That there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a
permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them
- like war and disease - so that they do not overturn political justice." Id. at 64 n. 19.
1993]
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ed, or circumscribed, neutrality, which he calls "the idea of an
overlapping consensus."
12
According to this idea, liberalism embraces on equal terms all
those religions and other comprehensive philosophies that affirm
from within their own particular belief-systems the political doc-
trines that liberalism entails. 3 But liberalism simultaneously dis-
criminates against all those religions (and other belief-systems) that
are inconsistent with liberalism. These illiberal religions, in other
words, are outside the scope of the overlapping consensus and
hence are not treated according to the same impartial terms as the
various liberal religions within the overlapping consensus.
Rawls articulates a concept called "public reason" to distin-
guish the liberal religions and philosophies inside the overlapping
consensus from the illiberal religions and philosophies outside the
12. Id. at 144.
13. As the metaphor of "overlapping consensus" suggests, Rawls envisions that differ-
ent religions and philosophies converge insofar as they accept the political doctrines of
liberalism, but diverge insofar as they disagree about metaphysical or meta-ethical issues
(including the meta-ethical issue of why the political doctrines of liberalism should be
accepted as correct). Rawls' idea of an overlapping consensus can also be illustrated in
the following way:
Each of the above circles represents the set of beliefs affirmed by a particular religion or
philosophy: for example, Episcopalianism, Unitarianism, Reform Judaism, and atheistic
humanism. These four belief-systems do not agree on all issues of metaphysics or the-
ology, but they all do accept the basic political precepts of liberalism (namely, liberty and
equality for all citizens). Cf. ihL at 145-46 (explaining his own "model case" of an over-
lapping consensus).
[Vaol. 43:963
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overlapping consensus.14 Liberal religions are "reasonable" from
the perspective of public reason, while illiberal religions are "un-
reasonable" from this perspective. Public reason, as Rawls uses the
term, has two basic components: one is epistemological, and the
other ethical. The epistemological component is, essentially, the
methods and conclusions of logic and science.15 The ethical com-
ponent, as I understand it, is the fundamental idea that the interests
of all persons count equally for purposes of determining their
rights and duties as citizens. 6
As we shall see, Rawls' ideas of an overlapping consensus
and of public reason prove to be useful tools for Establishment
14. Id. at 61-62. Rawls uses the concept of public reason for other purposes as well,
most particularly to identify sets of principles to be used by government bodies (including
the U.S. Supreme Court) to justify their actions as being in accord with the requirements
of justice. See id. at 231-33; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Pub-
lic Reason, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (using the ideal of public reason to
identify the kinds of moral arguments that are appropriate for public debate in a
pluralistic society). In this essay, however, I focus specifically on the most elementary
components of public reason, or what might be called the "substratum" of public reason:
the irreducible core precepts from which other principles or doctrines are derived.
15. Rawls puts it this way:
The values of public reason not only include the appropriate use of the funda-
mental concepts of judgment, inference and evidence, but also the virtues of
reasonableness and fair-mindedness as shown in abiding by the criteria and
procedures of commonsense knowledge and accepting the methods and conclu-
sions of science when not controversial.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 139. I am not sure exactly what Rawls
means by the qualifying phrase "when not controversial," which he applies to the methods
and conclusions of science. This qualification is one of the issues concerning the concept
of public reason that needs further exploration as the theory of political liberalism begins
to be used to help think through particular controversies that arise in the course of adju-
dicating church-state disputes. For example, some parents do not wish their children to
learn about the existence of dinosaurs because this knowledge would conflict with their
belief that the age of the earth is less than 10,000 years old. Cf Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988) (parents objected to schools teaching evolution theory as scientific fact). Is it con-
sistent or inconsistent with "public reason" to teach children what most, but not all, cit-
izens consider to be the entirely uncontroversial results of geological science (including
evidence of the earth's age)? The justification for this education is, in part, that children
need to learn some geology in order to become citizens who can think intelligently about
such public policy issues as whether scientists can predict earthquakes with sufficient
accuracy to permit the construction of nuclear energy facilities in certain locations. Issues
like this one will require church-state scholars to explore Rawls' concept of public reason
more extensively than he has done thus far.
16. See RAWLS, POLrnCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 225-226 ("the fundamental
idea of equality," which is the basis for the principles of justice as determined "in the
original position," also underlies the idea of public reason - because the "the guidelines
of public reason and the principles of justice have essentially the same grounds").
1993]
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Clause jurisprudence. 7 The overlapping consensus idea explains
why the Supreme Court's initial quest for complete neutrality was
destined to fail, and it also shows how the Court can modify the
concept of neutrality without having entirely to abandon the ideal
of impartiality. Moreover, the Court needs to develop the concept
of public reason, or some similar concept, in order to distinguish
those religions that are inevitably disfavored under its Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence from those religions that are not. Final-
ly, this reconstruction of Establishment Clause jurisprudence along
Rawlsian lines is as faithful to the original understanding of the
Establishment Clause as a contemporary interpretation of the clause
possibly can be - although it must be acknowledged that no con-
temporary interpretation can conform completely to original under-
standing, since the Framers of the First Amendment intended that
the new government be completely neutral toward all different reli-
gions, and, as we know now, complete neutrality is an impossibili-
ty.
8
II. COERCION V. ENDORSEMENT: CHOOSING BETWEEN THE Two
TESTS
Michael Paulsen, who advocates adoption of the coercion test,
candidly acknowledges that doing so would permit Congress to en-
act a law declaring Christianity to be the official religion of the
United States - so long as the law did nothing to compel anyone
to support this official religion by attendance, or financial support,
or some other means.'9 With all due respect to Professor Paulsen,
this acknowledgement should suffice to rebut all his arguments in
favor of the coercion test's adoption. Any test that would permit
Congress to choose an official religion should be summarily reject-
ed for this reason alone. To see why, let us consider the issue as
17. Lawrence Solum has already put Rawls' ideas to good use to address a related
jurisprudential issue, namely whether a judge may rely upon religious reasons when decid-
ing cases. See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083 (1990).
See also Solum, supra note 14 (applying the idea of public reason not only to judges,
but also to other government officials, as well as to citizens generally). And in a recent
article, Kathleen Sullivan also relies upon Rawls' work to address issues of church-state
jurisprudence. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHi. L.
REV. 195, 198-200 (1992). My approach here shares affinities with Professor Sullivan's
although it relies upon Rawls' work much more directly and extensively than hers.
18. See infra part IV.B.
19. Professor Paulsen made his position on this point unmistakably clear during his
oral remarks at this symposium. See supra note 7.
(V/ol. 43:963
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one of normative analysis - what should the Constitution say
about Paulsen's hypothetical? - before treating the issue as one
that requires interpretation of the piece of text we call the Estab-
lishment Clause.20
It should be obvious why, as a matter of normative analysis,
Congress should not be permitted to endorse Christianity as the
one true faith. Congress has no legitimate reason to prefer Chris-
tianity over Unitariamsm, Judaism, or Islam, for example. This is
so because from a purely philosophical perspective - the perspec-
tive of "public reason," to use Rawls' term - Christianity is no
more worthy of adherence than Unitarianism, Judaism, or Islam.21
What distinguishes Christianity from these other faiths is the belief
that Jesus of Nazareth is God incarnate in human flesh, and this
distinctively Christian creed cannot be proven true in any philo-
20. By "normative analysis," I mean moral reasomng or political theorizing without
regard to what the law actually provides. In other words, I am asking what principle
concerning church-and-state ought the Constitution contain (even if it takes a constitutional
amendment to adopt tis principle), rather than what principle is actually contained in the
Constitution. In this sense, the normative question I am considering is analogous to the
normative question of whether the federal Constitution ought to be amended to guarantee
the right to a decent education, assurung arguendo that the existing Constitution does not
guarantee this right. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21. Rawls would not put this point in precisely the same way as I do, and I must be
candid that here I am using the term "public reason" more to advance my own explana-
tion of political liberalism than to describe is. Rawls speaks of the "burdens of judg-
ment," wiuch he describes as the inability of human inquiry to determine conclusively the
answers to certain questions (with the result that reasonable people disagree upon the
answers to these questions). RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 55-56. I
accept Rawls's description of these burdens of judgment and think tlus description is well-
suited to questions of theology: e.g., does God exist?
But what is the method of mqtury for determining whether these burdens of judg-
ment apply to a particular issue of human concern? I'm not sure that Rawls' discussion is
entirely satisfactory on this point. In my own view, tis method of inquiry must be phi-
losophy itself: pure rational inquiry; the Socratic method, if you will. Thus, as I would
put it, philosophy (i.e., pure rational thought) tells us whether an issue is one about
which reasonable people may disagree, or whether it is an issue on wich all reasonable
people must agree. The philosophical method of inquiry that makes tis distinction is part
of public reason - or at least is a necessary antecedent to public reason - since public
reason is a form of reasoning to which all reasonable people must subscribe.
Now this philosophical method that underlies public reason is not a "comprehensive
view" - it does not provide answers to all issues of human concern. Indeed, as we have
just seen, one function of this philosopical method is to identify those issues of human
concern for which it cannot provide conclusive answers. Nevertheless, it is still philosophy
that supplies the methods and content of public reason (and marks the boundary between
those domains of human thought to which public reason applies and those to which it
does not). Accordingly, I have chosen to speak of "philosophy" as the perspective (or
method of inquiry) that determunes whether one religion is just as reasonable as another
(and therefore deserving of equal treatment in an overlapping consensus).
19931
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sophical sense. It is just as reasonable, from the perspective of
philosophy, to deny that Jesus was God-as-man in a unique way,
as it is to maintain the distinctively Christian claim that Jesus is
unique in his relationship to God.'
Even devout Christians, if they are intellectually honest and
open-minded, must acknowledge this fact.23 Of course, philosophy
does not require Christians to abandon their faith. Philosophy can-
not refute the divinity of Jesus any more than philosophy can
prove the divinity of Jesus. In other words, from the perspective of
philosophy, the divinity of Jesus is an open issue. People are intel-
lectually free to make a leap of faith, accepting Jesus as God-as-
man. At the same time, however, people are equally free, intellec-
tually speaking, to reject the special status of Jesus. Thus, Chris-
tianity is compatible with philosophy, but once a Christian exam-
ines the issue of religious faith from a philosophical point of view,
he or she must recognize that the rejection of Christianity is
equally as compatible with philosophy as its acceptance.
24
Because non-Christian religions (e.g., Unitarianism, Judaism,
and Islam) are equally as reasonable as Christianity from the per-
spective of philosophy, they deserve equal treatment from the gov-
ernment. This proposition is the essential tenet of political liberal-
ism.2 The argument in its support is as follows. First, citizens
22. For philosophers who have challenged the truth of Christianity, see MICHAEL L.
MARTIN, THE CASE AGAINST CHRISTIANITY (1991); BERTRAND RUSSELL, Why I am not a
Christian, in WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN AND OTHER ESSAYS (1957).
23. Using Michael Perry's term "self-critical rationality," I discussed this virtue of
intellectual honesty and open-mindedness in some detail in a previous essay. See Edward
B. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954, 959-60, 975-77
(1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THM ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
24. Rawls expresses this idea in a more general form:
[R]easonable persons do not all affirm the same comprehensive doctrine.
Moreover, they also recognize that ... many reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines are affirmed, not all of which may be true (indeed none of them may be
true). The doctrine that any reasonable person affirms is but one reasonable
doctrine among others ....
Thus, it is not in general unreasonable to affirm any one of a number
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We recognize that our own doctrine has,
and can have, for people generally, no special claims on them beyond their
own view of the merits. Others who affirm doctrines different from our own
are, we grant, reasonable also ....
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 60.
25. At least it is in my own conception of political liberalism. Cf. a at 61:
To conclude: reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgment set limits on
what can be reasonably justified to others, and so they endorse some form of
[Vol. 43:963
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should be treated equally insofar as they are equally situated.26
Second, citizens are equally situated with respect to their religious
beliefs if their religious beliefs are equally reasonable from the per-
spective of philosophy.' Therefore, the government should give
equal treatment to the equally reasonable religious beliefs of differ-
ent citizens. And so, since Unitarian, Jewish, and Muslim citizens
all hold religious beliefs equally reasonable to those of Christian
citizens, political liberalism entails that Congress be forbidden to
prefer Christianity over these other faiths.28
In this way, political liberalism leads directly to the "endorse-
ment" test that Justice O'Connor articulated in her Lynch v.
Donnell? 9 concurrence, and which a majority of the Court adopt-
ed in County of Allegheny v. ACLU. 3" Indeed, the justification
that Justice O'Connor gave for adopting the endorsement test,
which was the justification reiterated by the Court in Allegheny,
strongly echoes the central principles of political liberalism. In the
most memorable sentence of her concurrence, Justice O'Connor ex-
plained: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. It is unreasonable for us to use
political power, should we possess it, or share it with others, to repress com-
prehensive views that are not unreasonable.
26. This elemental egalitarianism is axiomatic to Rawls' entire theory 6f justice.
27. This proposition necessarily follows from the commitment to public reason. If
rational inquiry leads to the conclusion that there are two or more equally reasonable
ways to think about an issue, then these different ways of thinking are all equally sit-
uated from the perspective of rational inquiry and, hence, bound to be respected by all
persons as such. Accordingly, all persons holding equally reasonable views on a given
issue are equally situated in this respect. Another way of expressing the same idea, a way
closer to Rawls' own formulation, is to say that social relations among persons with
different ideas must be conducted on the basis of the equal legitimacy of all ideas that
are equally reasonable ttnder rational, or philosophical, scrutiny. See RAWLS, PoLITIcAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 60-61.
28. The question arises: must two or more religious belief-systems or comprehensive
philosophies be equally reasonable in order to deserve equal treatment from the govern-
ment? Or, alternatively, might different religious belief-systems be entitled to equal treat-
ment from the government even though some are more reasonable than others, so long as
all satisfy a minimum threshold of reasonableness? Although interesting and important, this
issue need not be resolved for purposes of this paper. Even if all sufficiently reasonable
religions deserve equal treatment from the government, it certainly remains correct to say
(as a special case of a more general principle) that all equally reasonable religions de-
serve this equal treatment. Thus, as long as I am correct in contending that certain reli-
gions are equally reasonable (e.g., Episcopalianism, Unitarianism, Buddhism, and the
Baha'i faith), then I am correct in maintaining that at least these religions are entitled to
equal treatment from the government.
29. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989).
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are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."3 1
In other words, to permit Congress to endorse Christianity as
the one true faith - as adoption of the coercion test would do -
would be to deny to Unitarians, Jews, and other non-Christians the
equality of treatment to which they are entitled. 'And this insistence
on equal treatment of non-Christian and Christian citizens, which is
a normative argument derived from political liberalism, remains the
most persuasive reason why the Supreme Court should not replace
the endorsement test with the coercion test.
32
III. THE IMPOSsiimrrY OF COMPLETE NEUTRALITY
Even if the Supreme Court adheres to the endorsement test,
the Court cannot guarantee completely equal treatment for all re-
ligious belief-systems that exist, or conceivably might exist, in our
society. When Justice O'Connor articulated the endorsement test in
Lynch, she expressed her -belief that the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits "disapproval" of any religion by the government, just as it
prohibits "endorsement" of any religion by the government.33 In
this respect, Justice O'Connor was merely rephrasing a refrain from
the early days of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
when the Court proclaimed that the clause required strict neutrality
towards all religions, the government being forbidden to favor any
or disfavor any.34 Although this aspiration to complete neutrality
was lofty and laudable, it nonetheless is unattainable, as Rawls
31. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
32. Although I shall not set forth the full argument here, I note briefly that the same
RawIsian argument that requires equal treatment for the Christian and the non-Christian
also requires equal treatment for the theist and atheist. This conclusion follows from the
fact that both theism and atheism are equally reasonable beliefs from the perspective of
philosophy. Compare RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (rev. ed. 1991) with
JOHN L. MACKIE, THE MIRACLE OF THEISM (1982).
One other point. John Garvey, in his discussion of possible harms caused by the
graduation prayer in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), fails to recognize the most
significant harm: i.e, the denial of equal treatment that the atheist suffers when the gov-
ernment endorses theism to be true. See John H. Garvey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 761, 763 (1993).
33. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-89.
34. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). See also School Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (quoting Minor v. Board of Educ., Su-
perior Court of Cincinnati (Feb. 1870) (Taft, J., dissenting) "The government is neutral,
and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.").
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makes perfectly plain in his account of political liberalism."
A. Liberalism's Disapproval of Illiberal Sects
Consider the most obvious illustration of this point: the possi-
bility that some fundamentalist sect of Christianity insists, based on
its reading of the Bible, that Congress must endorse Christianity as
the one true faith; otherwise, this sect believes that God will con-
demn all American citizens to eternal purgatory. This sectarian
claim is obviously incompatible With the proposition that Congress
is not permitted to endorse Christianity as the one true faith. No
one, not even the Supreme Court, can hold that Congress must not
endorse Christianity and, at the same time, accept as legitimate the
claim that Congress must endorse Christianity. It is a logical im-
possibility, and even the Supreme Court cannot escape the stric-
tures of logic.
Thus, the Supreme Court cannot maintain a position of strict
neutrality between an extremist sect that insists that Congress must
endorse Christianity and other religious groups, including other
Christian denominations, that accept the proposition that Congress
must not endorse Christianity over any other equally reasonable
religion.36 In short, the political philosophy of liberalism necessar-
ily divides religions into two categories: (1) liberal religions, which
are those philosophically reasonable religions that accept the liberal
position that the government must be impartial among all philo-
sophically reasonable religions; and (2) illiberal religions, which are
35. Rawls is by no means the only political philosopher who recognizes the impossibil-
ity of a completely neutral liberalism. Indeed, in recent years it has become commonplace
among both opponents and proponents of liberalism to point out that liberalism cannot
maintain a position of strict neutrality. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOS-
ES 93 (1991): "Liberalism is the theory not of the neutral state but of the minimally
committed state." See also Stephen Macedo, The Politics of Justification, 18 POLITICAL
THEORY 280, 289 (1990):
All religions compatible with liberalism will be respected; those not compatible
will be opposed. The liberal must in this way imply that religious convictions
incompatible with liberalism are unsupportable.
36. The Court itself recognized this truth in Allegheny:
[I]n a pluralistic society there may be some would-be theocrats, who
wish that their religion were an established creed, and some of them perhaps
may be even audacious enough to claim that the lack of established religion
discriminates against their preferences. But this claim gets no relief, for it con-
tradicts the fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. The
antidiscrimination principle inherent in the Establishment Clause necessarily
means that would-be discriminators on the basis of religion cannot prevail.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 611 (1989).
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those that deny this liberal position and insist, instead, that the
government endorse or favor their particular creed as the one true
faith. While the government can maintain a position of neutrality
among liberal religions, liberalism itself necessitates that the gov-
ernment must disfavor and discriminate against illiberal religions.3"
In other words, contrary to Justice O'Connor's hope for strictly
equal treatment of all religions, we now see that adoption of the
endorsement test itself necessarily requires the Court to disapprove
of any religious sect insofar as it insists upon the government's
endorsement of its particular creeds.38
Moreover, we must recognize also that liberalism's disapproval
of illiberal religions is necessarily a rejection of these illiberal
religions as theologically unsound. After all, if the extremist Chris-
tian sect is correct in claiming that all Americans will bum in hell
forever unless Congress endorses Christianity, then surely the Con-
stitution should permit Congress to endorse Christianity. The infi-
nite suffering of all citizens is obviously too high a price to pay
for political correctness.39
But those of us who are liberals continue to insist that Con-
gress be forbidden to endorse Christianity. This is so because we
37. Illiberal religions are disfavored in the specific sense that a part of their belief-
system is deemed illegitimate by the liberal state, whereas the belief-systems of liberal
religions are accepted by the government as wholly legitimate. Rawls captures this point
when he explains that political liberalism rejects "neutrality" if "neutrality" means "that
the state is to ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any conception of the
good they freely affirm." RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 180-83. The
reason is that political liberalism "allows that only permissible conceptions (those that
respect the principles of justice) can be pursued." Id. (emphasis added). But, Rawls goes
on to say, the meaning of neutrality "can be amended to allow for this; and as so
amended, the state is to secure equal opportunity to advance any permissible conception."
Id. (emphasis added).
38. "Disapproval" in this context is not too strong a term. If the endorsement test is
correct, as liberalism insists it is, then the extremist sect is necessarily incorrect - i.e.,
wrong - in claiming that Congress must endorse its creeds. Liberalism therefore disap-
proves as being wrong the insistence by any sect that its creeds be established as the
nation's official religion. This is true even if this insistence stems from the sect's sincere
religious belief that God commands the official endorsement of its creeds. Surely this
usage accords with common understanding: liberal senators and representatives, if they are
indeed committed to liberalism, would be required to express their profound disapproval
of any bill that would establish Christianity as the nation's official religion.
39. In other words, even if God would be unjust (according to political liberalism) to
punish Americans with eternal damnation if Congress refused to endorse Christianity, if
we nonetheless knew that God would impose this punishment, we would acquiesce in the
congressional endorsement of Christianity, despite its injustice, because we would not wish
to subject Americans to the fate of eternal damnation.
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liberals reject as theologically unreasonable the idea that God
would punish all Americans with eternal damnation if Congress
failed to endorse Christianity as the one true faith. Even if Chris-
tianity is the one true faith, liberalism entails the recognition that,
from the perspective of philosophical reason, Christianity is not the
only reasonable faith. Given the equal reasonableness of other
religions to intellectually honest human minds, liberals cannot
accept the idea that God would be so cruel as to subject all Amer-
icans to eternal purgatory if Congress remains impartial among all
equally reasonable faiths. The liberal view, which is shared by
liberal Christians (who believe for themselves that Christianity is
the one true faith), is that God would not have caused other reli-
gions to be equally reasonable from the perspective of philosophy
if God had intended to punish people for believing that their gov-
ernment should remain impartial among all philosophically reason-
able religions.
In this way, then, liberalism necessarily rejects as theologically
untenable any religion that claims that citizens will suffer eternal
damnation if the government does not endorse that particular reli-
gion as the one true faith.'
40. I understand Rawls' account of political liberalism to be in accord with my own
explanation of liberalism on this point. Rawls himself considers the example of a religion
that insists that "the salvation of a whole people" depends upon the state's endorsement
of that particular religion. If this occurs, Rawls says, "we may have no alternative but to
deny this, or to imply its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped
to avoid," namely that someone's religious belief is theologically unreasonable. RAWLs,
PoUTICAL LmOLAUsM, supra note 1, at 152.
Rawls, however, goes on to say:
[W]e need not say that their religious beliefs are not true, since to deny that
religious beliefs can be publicly and fully established by reason is not to say
they are then false. Of course, we do not believe the doctrine the believers
here assert, and this is shown in what we do . . . . [O]ur actions . . . imply
that we believe the concern for salvation does not require anything incompatible
with [equal treatment for all reasonable religions]. Still, we do not put forward
more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the politi-
cal aim of consensus.
Id. at 153 (citation omitted). I confess I am not altogether sure about the meaning of this
passage. It seems to me that liberalism does reject as false, as well as unreasonable, the
idea that the state must endorse a particular creed if the people are to avoid eternal dam-
nation. As I have said, were this idea not false, but instead true, it would follow that the
government should endorse the creed so as to avoid the horrible consequence of infinite
suffering for all citizens. I think Rawls recognizes this point when he writes that "we
believe that the concern for salvation does not require" a rejection of the principle of
equal treatment for all philosophically reasonable religions. Id. In any event, if I am mis-
understanding this passage, it is possible that Rawls' account of political liberalism differs
from my own in this detail.
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B. Other Disfavored Religious Beliefs
There are many additional examples of religious beliefs that
are denied equal treatment by political liberalism because they are
outside the scope of the overlapping consensus. A detailed exami-
nation of such other examples must await another occasion. But I
would fail to convey an accurate impression of political liberalism
if I did not identify briefly some of the other religious beliefs that
are unavoidably disfavored by a regime that has adopted a liberal
Constitution.
First of all, as Rawls himself points out, some religions reject
one-person-one-vote and other democratic principles and advocate
instead antidemocratic ideas, including slavery or the exclusion of
women from the suffrage. Since these antidemocratic ideas are
contrary to the principles of justice affirmed by political liberalism,
these religions are illiberal and must be denied equal treatment by
the liberal state, just as liberalism denies equal treatment to those
illiberal religions that insist upon establishing a theocracy.4 1
Second, some sects reject the efficacy of modem medicine,
preferring to rely solely upon prayer to cure disease. Suppose, for
example, members of such a sect, on theological grounds, refuse
vaccination even though science shows that the vaccine reduces the
spread of a highly contagious, deadly disease.42 The liberal state
will insist upon vaccinating these sectarians, despite their conscien-
tious objection, in order to reduce the risk of contagion to other
citizens.4 3 In this way, liberalism embraces the medical advances
41. See id. at 196-97. The liberal state, of course, may choose to tolerate these un-
democratic or illiberal religions in the sense of permitting them to exist and even to
proselytize their creeds. But the liberal state, if it is to remain liberal, cannot permit them
to achieve their objectives - even though their objectives are motivated by sincere reli-
gious beliefs (e.g., a belief that God requires women to be denied the suffrage). Thus, the
liberal state necessarily must frustrate the aims of these illiberal religions, and in this
specific way the liberal state denies equal treatment to these illiberal religions, since the
liberal state does not frustrate the aims of liberal religions.
42. Assume that the vaccine poses little or no danger to anyone who receives the
vaccination. In other words, the only objection stated to the vaccination is the theological
argument that God wants people to trust God to heal them, if it is God's will; therefore,
God enjoins people from using medical procedures and commands them to pray instead.
43. Based on the reasoning of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), one
might argue that compulsory vaccination is "neutral" because it applies to all citizens, not
just those with certain religious beliefs. But as Douglas Laycock has explained, such
"formal" neutrality is not the same as "substantive" neutrality. See Douglas Laycock,
Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
993 (1990). In any event, it is perfectly plain that a compulsory vaccination law expresses
the state's implicit "disapproval" (to use Justice O'Connor's term) of any religion that ob-
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caused by scientific investigation and rejects the religious objection
to immunization as theologically unreasonable.4'
Third, and similarly, the liberal state will require parents to
give their children medical treatment, even if the parents sincerely
believe that their children will bum in hell forever if they receive
this medical treatment. Liberalism rejects as unreasonable any reli-
gious belief that requires a child to die prematurely when an effi-
cacious cure is readily available. Again, were it really true that
giving the child the medicine would cause her to suffer eternal
damnation, then obviously the state should not require that the
child receive the medicine. But liberalism denies that God would
permit humans to invent life-saving medicines and then punish an
innocent child for being the beneficiary of this technology.4"
Fourth, as Rawls explains, the liberal state forces parents to
educate their-children in certain ways, even if this liberal education
conflicts with the parents' religious beliefs. For example, the liberal
state may require children to learn the principles of justice affirmed
by the liberal state itself, including the principle of racial equality,
even if the parents' religion dictates that their children should not
be exposed to such liberal ideas.46 Likewise, the liberal state may
jects to the vaccination on theological grounds.
44. Science is a part of public reason, whereas the sectarian objection to immunization
is not.
45. It should be noted also that the coercion test does not adequately explain this case.
Here, the liberal state does more than deny equal treatment to these religious parents. The
state, in fact, coerces the parents to violate their religion. Thus, even adoption of the
coercion test (which purports to prohibit such coercion) would require an explanation of
what religious beliefs are unreasonable, so that the state legitimately may coerce their
adherents to violate them.
46. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In this case, federal
law denied racist schools the same tax exemption available to schools that did not dis-
criminate on the basis of race. Several schools whose racist policies were based on reli-
gious doctrine sued the government, claiming that denying them the tax exemption was a
violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court rejected this claim, arguing that the government's commitment to eradicat-
ing racism justified denying equal tax treatment to racist schools. Thus, the Bob Jones
case illustrates the Rawsian principle that the government may deny equal treatment to
religions that reject the fundamental principles of justice affirmed by liberalism.
Also, it should be noted that requiring school children to learn about the principles
of justice affirmed by the liberal state is not the same as requiring these children to
affirm these principles as their own. In other words, teaching children what the Constitu-
tion provides, so that the children are informed about the system of government their
society has adopted, is very different from requiring the children in school to swear their
allegiance to the Constitution. Cf West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (holding that requiring school children to salute the flag is a violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments). Some parents, however, might object on religious grounds
1993]
978 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:963
require children to learn the methodologies of math and science, so
that these children are in a position to become productive members
of the national economy, even if the parents object to this educa-
tion for religious reasons. 47
In all these ways and more, political liberalism disfavors reli-
gious faiths that are unreasonable from the perspective of public
reason.
48
IV. FROM POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Thus far, as I indicated, we have been considering the prob-
lem of church-state relations purely as a problem of political phi-
losophy - solely as an issue of normative analysis, rather than as
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. It is now time to ask
what relevance this normative analysis has to the task of interpret-
ing the United States Constitution. There are two alternative an-
swers to this question, either of which suffices to make the consti-
tutional law of church-state relations congruent with the political
to instruction about the Constitution and its commitment to racial equality. But unlike an
objection to the Pledge of Allegiance, the liberal state need not feel obligated to accom-
modate this objection. This is so because the liberal state must consider itself permitted to
instruct the next generation of citizens about the principles of justice and constitutional
law upon which the liberal state is founded. (I am grateful to Jesse Choper for pointing
out the need to clarify this distinction.)
47. Rawls writes:
[Various religious sects oppose the culture of the modem world and wish to
lead their common life apart from its unwanted influences. A problem now
arises about their children's education and the requirements the state can im-
pose .... [Political liberalism requires] that children's education include such
things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights, so that, for exam-
ple, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that aposta-
sy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their continued membership when
they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear
of punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their education should
also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them
to be self-supporting ....
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERAULSM, supra note 1, at 199. This passage indicates that Rawls
might consider Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (sustaining Amish parents' re-
fusal to send children to school beyond eighth grade), to have been decided incorrectly.
In any event, political liberalism certainly would not permit a religious sect to deny its
children knowledge of sixth grade math or science.
48. Those of us who work in the field of church-state jurisprudence need to better
understand this concept of public reason, which permits such extensive official disapproval
of illiberal and unreasonable religions, while simultaneously requiring the state to maintain
impartiality among all reasonable and liberal religions. There is not space here to explore
this idea in detail. Suffice it to say for now that some such idea is essential to defend
liberalism's distinction between reasonable and unreasonable religions.
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philosophy of political liberalism.
A. The Trans-Textualist Answer49
The first answer is that the Constitution itself, properly under-
stood, calls upon the judiciary to engage in the methodology of
political philosophy in order to perform the function of constitu-
tional interpretation: the judge must ask what an ideal constitution
would provide with regard to the particular issue before the court,
in order to answer what result the actual Constitution provides
regarding the issue. This approach to constitutional interpretation
has been advocated by numerous constitutional scholars.50
This approach draws largely upon such textual provisions as
the Ninth Amendment to argue that the text looks beyond itself to
ascertain the scope of the rights that citizens possess regarding
such fundamental matters as the relationship of church and state. In
other words, according to this approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion, it really does not matter what the specific text and intent of
the Establishment Clause would provide with regard to a particular
case. By adding the Ninth Amendment to the Bill of Rights, the
Framers indicated their intent that, should the First Amendment, as
originally drafted and understood, be insufficient in its protection
of intellectual liberty from government interference, then the courts
should supplement the rights specifically guaranteed by the First
Amendment with additional rights, derived by exercising the meth-
odology of political philosophy as best they can.
I shall not defend this approach to constitutional interpretation.
It has been ably defended by its leading exponents. For the sake of
candor, I simply note that I largely subscribe to this approach to
constitutional interpretation, although in a form that is tempered by
a decent respect for the virtue of judicial restraint.5'
This approach to constitutional interpretation causes one to
turn to political liberalism to guide the development of church-state
jurisprudence. Since political liberalism is the best that political
49. By "trans-textualist" I mean to include any theory of constitutional adjudication that
embraces the proposition that answers to constitutional questions are not determined solely
by resolving the meaning of the text of the Constitution itself.
50. For an especially eloquent statement of this view by one of its most prominent
proponents, see Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, re-
printed in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 337 (Randy Barnett ed., 1989).
51. This moderately restrained form of the trans-textualist approach to constitutional in-
terpretation is best exemplified by the writings of Archibald Cox. See, e.g., ARCHmALD
Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
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philosophy has to offer so far on the subject of church-state rela-
tions, the judiciary should rely upon political liberalism in its adju-
dication of church-state disputes.52
B. The Clause-Specific Answer
Even if one rejects the foregoing approach to constitutional
interpretation in favor of a clause-specific approach, one still
should turn to political liberalism to aid in resolution of Establish-
ment Clause disputes. The reason is that political liberalism con-
forms, insofar as is logically possible, with the original understand-
ing of the Establishment Clause - at least as the Establishment
Clause was originally understood by its principal author, James
Madison.
Madison, as is evidenced by his famous Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments, 53 and other writings,-4
believed strongly in the principle that the government must treat all
religions impartially - the principle we associate today with the
Court's endorsement test.55 Indeed, as Justice Souter explained in
his concurrence in Lee v. Weisman,56 Madison's Memorial itself
articulated the functional equivalent of today's endorsement test
when it condemned any law that "degrades from equal rank of
Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those
of the Legislative authority." 57 Madison thus expressed precisely
the same view as did Justice O'Connor when, in articulating the
endorsement test, she wrote: "The Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community."
58
52. Cf Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning; Democratic Interpretation, and the Consti-
tution, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 32-33 (1992) (articulating a Rawlsian approach to the
interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, with additional reliance
upon the Ninth Amendment as necessary).
53. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer
eds., 1987).
54. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, DETACHED MEMORANDA, reprinted in JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 92 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) ("The establishment of the
chaplainship to Congress is a palpable violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitu-
tional principles.").
55. See supra note 8.
56. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667-78 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 2674 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST
REUIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82, 83 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
58. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 667, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The problem, however, is that Madison, like Justice O'Connor,
thought that the government could be strictly impartial to all reli-
gious faiths. In the Memorial, Madison said that religion was
"wholly exempt from [the] cognizance" of the state, which was
incompetent to judge the truth or falsity of any religious belief. 9
But, as we have seen, this standard of complete inpartiality is not
logically possible: m order to accept this standard as correct, the
state necessarily must reject as incorrect any religion that insists
upon establishing a theocracy
Thus, even if one wishes to adhere to Madison's original
conception of church-state relations in interpreting the Establish-
ment Clause, one still must modify the Madisoman conception to
cure it of its logical inconsistency Political liberalism accomplishes
this task. it remains as faithful as possible to the original
Madisonian goal of equal treatment for all religions, while modify-
ing this standard only as necessary to conform to the strictures of
philosophical reason. Consequently, anyone who wishes that Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence conform as closely as possible to
original intent should adopt political liberalism as the best available
guide to that original intent.
V CONCLUSION
I have attempted to explain why the judiciary should turn to
Rawls' philosophy of political liberalism to aid in the development
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Political liberalism is the
political philosophy that animates the best possible conception of
the Establishment Clause and its aspiration of governmental impar-
tiality towards conflicting religions (and other comprehensive be-
lief-systems). Accordingly, I close by urging everyone interested in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to consider carefully Rawls'
work on political liberalism.
59. See MADISON, supra note 53, 1, 5.
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